This paper provides an overview of recent papers which use estimated New Keynesian models to study the extent to which …scal policy can be used to stabilize the economy. We use a variety of di¤erent New Keynesian models, estimated on data for both the US and for the Euro area, and highlight the diverse transmission channels through which …scal policy acts in these models. Although we …nd that …scal policy can provide a useful complement to monetary policy, especially in models where consumers have …nite horizons, there are important limitations to the value added of …scal policy. 1 The material in this paper formed part of the …rst author's Keynote Lecture at the CESifo Summer Institute, San Servolo, Venice, July 2004. We are grateful to participants at the seminar for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the Editor, Roel Beetsma, and to three anonymous referees for helpful and detailed comments on an earlier version of the paper. We are of course responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.
Introduction
There is renewed interest in the role that …scal policy can play in macroeconomic stabilization. After a decade in which the focus has mainly been on the delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks, attention is shifting to the potential role of …scal policy. We seem to be again moving towards some of the opinions that were prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s, which seemed to have been swept away by the monetarist-new classical revolution. Fiscal policy is again seen by some as an e¤ective and necessary tool of stabilization policy.
In the case of EMU, the role of …scal policy has received particular attention. Within EMU, decentralized …scal policy is the only policy instrument that can respond to asymmetric shocks. This has led some observers to go beyond the initial suggestion that within EMU automatic …scal stabilizers should be the main source of counter-cyclical …scal action (see Buti et al. 1998 Buti et al. , 2001 , and to ask whether …scal policy rules could be designed to substitute for the loss of monetary policy as an instrument of domestic demand management (see Westaway, 2003) 1 . One di¢ culty in analyzing whether …scal policy can play a valuable role is that …scal policy is a more complex policy instrument than monetary policy. In the original Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis the channel of transmission of …scal policy, through direct expenditures and disposable income, was well understood. Even once additional channels of transmission were introduced for …scal policy, through portfolio and wealth e¤ects 2 , the analysis was qualitatively very similar. In contrast, the 'New Keynesian' approach 3 , which combines the individual dynamic optimizing framework adopted by theorists from the 'new classical'tradition (such as real business cycle theory), with the assumption of sticky prices and/or wages, allows for a richer range of transmission e¤ects. Modern macroeconomic models in the tradition of the New Keynesian approach have been developed so as to allow a number of both demand and supply-side e¤ects for …scal policy. 1 For a recent survey of the issues surrounding monetary and …scal interactions in EMU see Beetsma and Debrun (2004) . They also cover issues surrounding the strategic interactions between monetary and …scal authorities, which are not covered in detail here.
2 See for instance Blinder and Solow (1973) , and Tobin and Buiter (1976) . 3 The 'New Keynesian' approach is also generally known by other names, such as the New Neoclassical Synthesis (cf. Goodfriend and King, 1997) , or the sticky-price DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) approach.
The other di¢ culty lies in the fact that many 'New Keynesian' models are calibrated, or partially calibrated and estimated. In calibrated models 4 , the impact of …scal and monetary policy are studied through simulations, using parameters for the behavioral relationships that are drawn from other empirical studies, or are based on theoretical priors. Increasingly a number of New Keynesian models are estimated (cf. Smets and Wouters, 2002 , Leith and Malley, 2002 , Muscatelli et al., 2003a ,b, Del Negro et al. 2005 . However, because the coe¢ cients in the model equations are highly non-linear functions of the behavioral (structural) parameters, some restrictions are required to ensure identi…cation or to ensure that the parameters are estimated with an acceptable degree of precision.
This paper provides an overview of recent attempts to use estimated New Keynesian models to study the extent to which …scal policy can be used to stabilize the economy (see Muscatelli et al., 2003a Muscatelli et al., ,b, 2004b . In these papers we have used estimated New Keynesian models to study the way in which …scal policy rules, which mainly take the form of automatic stabilizers, interact with a monetary policy rule which characterizes the behavior of an independent central bank. We use a variety of di¤erent New Keynesian models, estimated on data for both the US and for the Euro area. These highlight the diverse transmission channels through which …scal policy operates. Fiscal policy's role is enhanced by the presence of forward-looking behavior by consumers, and by the presence of wealth e¤ects on consumption if Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Interestingly, there seems to be some 'value added' from …scal policy, despite the fact that price and wage stickiness in these models is typically of limited duration. However, there are potential trade-o¤s between output and in ‡ation stabilisation.
As an extension to our earlier work, we also examine the behavior of …scal policies in a basic two-country version of our Euro-area model, in the presence of a monetary union. This focuses on the case of EMU without structural asymmetries, and highlights the extent to which an active …scal policy might add value in the presence of asymmetric demand and supply shocks.
In our analysis we do not explicitly examine some of the strategic (gametheoretic) interdependencies between the …scal and monetary authorities. These are an important …eld of study in the theoretical literature (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998 , Dixit and Lambertini, 2001  and for a survey Beetsma and Debrun, 2004) . By focusing on simple feedback rules we also do not conduct the type of welfare analysis of monetary-…scal interactions pioneered by Benigno and Woodford (2003) . We do nevertheless examine the impact of di¤erent policy rules on output and in ‡ation variability, and our results can therefore be interpreted in terms of a conventional welfare analysis framework (see Woodford, 2003) .
In the next section we provide a brief survey of the nature of monetary and …scal policy interactions in New Keynesian models. In Section 3 we present a broad outline of our estimated structural single-country models. We evaluate the extent to which …scal policy adds value in the single-country model context in Section 4. In Section 5, we present some preliminary results using a two-country version of the New Keynesian model. Section 6 concludes.
Fiscal Policy in New Keynesian Models: a Brief Overview
Early versions of New Keynesian macroeconomic models involved a limited role for …scal policy, by assuming that taxation is lump-sum and that representative agents have an in…nite planning horizon. By assuming Ricardian equivalence, the only impact through which …scal policy interacts with monetary policy is through a resource-withdrawal e¤ect 5 . When simple feedback rules for government expenditure are combined with an inertial monetary policy rule, it can be shown that the impact is not unambiguously welfareimproving in terms of reducing the volatility of output and in ‡ation (see Muscatelli et al., 2003a) . The impact of …scal policy is solely that of changing the pro…le of aggregate demand.
Whether consumption actually increases in such models depends crucially on the assumptions made about labour supply and price-stickiness, given the linkage between consumption and leisure (and hence the real wage) via the consumer's optimization problem 6 . On the other hand, empirical studies of 5 The usual assumption is that the government does not violate its solvency constraint on the budget, i.e. that the …scal policy regime is 'Ricardian'(see Woodford, 1994 , Sims, 1994 . Throughout this paper we shall consider policies that do not violate the solvency constraint, and which do not run into the problems associated with the '…scal theory of the price level'(see Buiter 2001 , Canzoneri et al., 2001 . 6 For a detailed analysis of the transmission of …scal policy in the standard New Keynesian model, see Linnemann and Schabert (2003) .
the impact of …scal policy on the business cycle using VAR-type models do not support this simplest version of the New Keynesian model. Studies such as Galí (1994) , Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . De Arcangelis and Lamartina (2003) provide a useful survey. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2004a) show that …scal shocks have conventional Keynesian e¤ects, in that an increase in government spending causes a persistent rise in output 7 and consumption. In a non-VAR context, Giavazzi et al. (2000) investigate both country and time-speci…c …scal policy events and show that both Keynesian and neoclassical (Ricardian) e¤ects are present. Galí et al. (2002) demonstrate that by adding non-optimising behavior to the conventional New Keynesian model on the part of a proportion of consumers, who are constrained to consume out of current income (so-called 'rule of thumb' consumers), one can, under particular parameterizations, provide an explanation for the positive response of consumption to a temporary government spending shock. In essence, if the increase in government spending generates an increase in the real wage (providing the substitution e¤ect between consumption and leisure dominates the wealth e¤ect), this generates an increase in aggregate consumption because 'rule-of-thumb' consumers spend out of current income. The dynamics of this relationship can be made richer by introducing inertia in consumer behavior through, say, habit formation.
A number of other channels can be introduced for …scal policy. A separate role can be introduced for taxation, and taxes can be modelled as lump-sum or distortionary. They can also be designed to have a di¤erential impact on optimizing and non-optimising consumers. By including payroll taxes one can also model a supply-side impact for taxation.
Turning to government debt, this provides another channel of interaction between …scal and monetary policy through the government budget identity. Debt-…nanced …scal de…cits will have an impact on aggregate demand in versions of the New Keynesian model which depart from Ricardian equivalence because of the presence of …nite horizons, as in the classic Blanchard-Yaari model (see Blanchard, 1985) . Alternative e¤ects of government debt on consumer behavior can also be considered, such as the impact that …nancial wealth (money and bonds) has on household transactions costs, which also can explain a departure from Ricardian equivalence (see Linnemann and Schabert, 2002, Schabert, 2004) . Clearly one could also introduce more complex supply-side e¤ects for …scal policy by allowing public expenditures (invest-7 The implied …scal multiplier is close to or greater than unity. ment) to have a role in private production and for tax distortions to impact on private investment decisions.
As noted earlier, there is a trade-o¤ in estimating New Keynesian models with respect to the richness and complexity of the model which can be considered and the number of structural parameters which can be estimated freely. In what follows we examine the interaction of …scal and monetary policy rules in the context of estimated New Keynesian models for the USA and Euroland, which contain a number of the features discussed above: habit persistence in consumption; non-optimising (rule-of-thumb) consumers; …-nite horizons in consumers' optimizing decisions; sticky prices; government expenditures; taxation e¤ects on both consumption and on …rms'marginal costs (through payroll taxes). In the case of each model, the question we address is whether …scal policy, through feedback rules on output adds value to the stabilization role played by monetary policy, which is assumed to follow a standard (inertial) forward-looking in ‡ation targeting rule.
3 Structure of the Models
General Structure
We consider two basic versions of the New Keynesian model for estimation and policy simulation. The models are set out in detail in the Appendix. The basic model follows Galí et al. (2002) in assuming that some consumers (a proportion #) are non-optimising (rule-of-thumb), and simply consume out of current disposable income. We modify the Galí et al. (2002) model by allowing for habit formation on the part of optimizing consumers (the remaining proportion 1 #), who optimize over an in…nite horizon with a discount factor . Despite the presence of non-optimising consumers, Ricardian equivalence holds in the model as there is no link between government liabilities and aggregate demand.
The production sector of the model follows the standard New Keynesian assumption of monopolistic competition in the production of the consumption good, which …rms produce using a Cobb-Douglas technology with labour and a …xed capital stock. Total consumption is given by an aggregate of the imperfectly substitutable goods, where the consumption aggregator is given by a CES function. This coupled with the assumption of sticky prices in the form of Calvo's (1983) assumption of staggered price setting, combined with a degree of partial indexation which introduces an element of in ‡ation persistence (see Galí et al., 2001) 8 . Following the Calvo pricing mechanism, (1 ) is the proportion of …rms adjusting their prices every period, and the remainder supply output on demand, at a constant price. Of those who adjust prices, a share of these is assumed to index prices to in ‡ation in the previous period, whereas the rest, (1 ), set their prices optimally to maximize expected discounted real pro…ts, with a discount factor . We do not model wage rigidity explicitly 9 , but simply assume in our simulations that nominal wages adjust to past in ‡ation over two quarters.
In this basic model (which we label version I), …scal policy impacts on the economy through the New Keynesian 'IS-curve' by directly a¤ecting the consumption of rule-of-thumb (ROT) consumers, and the consumptionsmoothing behavior of optimizing consumers. Government spending is nonproductive and adds to aggregate demand. It is …nanced through personal taxation, which is paid by consumers (of both types), and through a payroll tax on …rms'employees. The payroll tax ensures that taxation impacts on pricing behavior by …rms by introducing a tax wedge in the New Keynesian 'Phillips Curve'.
We then consider a modi…ed version of this model (which we label version II), which introduces the debt-channel as an additional channel of transmission for …scal policy. Whilst retaining the assumption that some consumers follow a ROT behavior, here we introduce the assumption that optimizing consumers have Blanchard (1985) -type …nite horizons with a constant probability of death as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004) . This removes Ricardian equivalence, and allows debt-…nanced …scal policy to impact, through wealth e¤ects, on the consumption of optimizing consumers. The introduction of a wealth e¤ect also introduces a channel of interaction between monetary and …scal policy, as interest-rate changes will impact on aggregate demand through the government budget constraint.
Measuring the Performance of Policy Rules
We simulate our estimated models by combining feedback …scal rules based on the usual structure of automatic …scal stabilizers with a forward-looking in ‡ation targeting monetary (interest rate) rule, which is estimated/calibrated on the data, and which allows us to examine the e¢ ciency of di¤erent …scal rules when combined with a monetary rule. Both the …scal and monetary policy rules are allowed to display a certain amount of inertia, in that as well as depending on the output gap (and expected in ‡ation in the case of the monetary rule), they contain an autoregressive element.
In analyzing the interactions between …scal and monetary policy rules we do not conduct a formal welfare analysis as in Benigno and Woodford (2003) , or an analysis of the optimal degree of in ‡ation, government debt and tax rates volatility as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) . Nevertheless, our results provide a useful benchmark in understanding how …scal policy rules, as characterized by automatic stabilizers, interact with monetary policy rules in the current institutional arrangements where the …scal and monetary policy authorities act independently of each other. We present our results both as dynamic simulation runs and as variance frontiers illustrating the trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation volatility of di¤erent degrees of responsiveness of interest rates to expected in ‡ation. The results can therefore be interpreted without having to adopt a particular welfare criterion.
One possible criticism of our approach is that, by focusing on estimated/calibrated monetary policy rules, we do not examine how the monetary authorities might respond to di¤erent forms of …scal intervention. In practice one might expect an independent central bank to change its optimal response to change in response to changes in the …scal rule. We might therefore be underestimating the welfare-enhancing e¤ect of some …scal rules. There are three possible responses to this observation. First, estimated monetary policy rules typically involve a greater degree of inertia than optimal monetary rules derived from a dynamic optimization exercise 10 , and hence looking at fully optimal rules may not be a good description of how monetary policy works in practice. Second, the information requirements for the monetary authorities to respond to perceived changes in …scal rule are likely to be quite demanding. This issue, together with the related one of strategic interactions between …scal and monetary authorities will be explored in future work 11 . Third, the 10 In Muscatelli et al. (2003a) we compare the performance of an optimal monetary policy rule with an estimated/calibrated rule. There are various possible explanations for the estimated inertia in reaction functions. Objectives such as …nancial stability are not captured by simple New Keynesian models. Inertial rules may also be robust in some instances (see Giannoni and Woodford 2002a,b) .
11 This is an issue which pre-dates New Keynesian models (see McKibbin and Sachs, aim of this work is not to conduct some historical counterfactual analysis to see if monetary or …scal policy 'could have done better'during some particular historical period. Rather, it looks at whether how di¤erent …scal policy rules perform in the presence of the type of monetary policy behavior that has characterized the recent era of in ‡ation targeting. Our work complements that of previous authors. Gordon and Leeper (2003) …nd, using a calibrated model for the US economy, that …scal stabilization policies tends to destabilize the business cycle because of their impact on debt service obligations. Jones (2002) uses an estimated stochastic growth model (without price stickiness) for the US to show that …scal policy had limited stabilization e¤ects in the post-war period. Andrés and Doménech (2003) also examine the design of …scal rules and their impact on macroeconomic stability, but focus mainly on the comparison of distortionary and lump-sum taxes on output volatility. Their model does not allow for non-optimising behavior or …nite horizons on the part of consumers, but allows for a richer speci…cation of distortionary taxation. They …nd that distortionary taxes may worsen the in ‡ation-output volatility trade-o¤ unless there are substantial real and nominal rigidities. Hence automatic stabilizers may not be welfare-enhancing because of their impact on the aggregate supply side of the economy, unless there are considerable frictions in the economy.
Policy Rules

Monetary Authority
In what follows, 'hatted'lower-case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady state, and 'barred'variables denote steady-state values. The forward-looking monetary policy rule for the nominal interest rate b i t follows a form similar to the standard forward-looking Taylor rule speci…cation which has become commonplace in the literature 12 (see Clarida et al., 1998 Clarida et al., , 2000 Muscatelli et al. 2002; Woodford, 2002a,b), 1988) . 12 The main di¤erence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) . For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) . For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001) .
where the rule also allows for interest-rate smoothing (inertia) if 3 6 = 0, and where b y t+s is the output gap (expected at time t+s), and b t+q is expected in ‡ation (at time t+q).
Fiscal authority
We consider a simple backward-looking format for the government's …scal policy rules (automatic stabilizers), following inter alia Van den Noord (2000), Westaway (2003) and Andrés and Doménech (2003) . This captures the more realistic lagged response of …scal policy to macroeconomic variables due to automatic stabilizers:
where b g t is government spending, b t is the vector of our two tax measures, personal taxes b t t and payroll taxes, b t t . Our taxation rule therefore imposes the same adjustment pattern on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix of tax measures might improve the design of policy 13 . In the case of our single-country models we adopt …scal policy rules that only feed back on the output gap and the lagged policy variable. Our chosen policy parameters and estimated structural parameters are such that when the single-country models are simulated the …scal policy regime is Ricardian and there are no problems with determinacy.
For our baseline case, we set 1 = ' 1 = 0:6; 2 = ' 2 = 0:5; 3 = ' 3 = 0:05. A coe¢ cient of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van den Noord (2000) and adopted in studies on …scal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003) , and are broadly consistent with the correlations for US …scal data over the cycle (cf. Gordon and Leeper, 2003) . We allow for an element of inertia as empirical estimates of …scal policy rules on quarterly data suggest an important role for an autoregressive term. The term on debt, which follows Bohn (1998) , has a coe¢ cient of 0.05. This feedback on debt is su¢ cient to ensure that there is determinacy.
The government is assumed to …nance its de…cits using indexed bonds. The debt dynamics are given by a log-linearised version of the standard government budget constraint (where b r t is the real interest rate, and d g T R t are government transfers which are kept constant during our simulations):
Our models are simulated under forward-looking (model-consistent) expectations, where consumers take into account the policy rules and the government budget constraint.
Econometric Estimation and Calibration
In our empirical work (see Muscatelli et al. 2003b Muscatelli et al. , 2004b we estimate the IS and Phillips curves for version I of the model using US quarterly data, over the sample period 1970 (1)-2001(2). For the Euro area, we estimate the IS curve and use the estimates for the Phillips curve reported in Galí et al. (2001) 14 . The Euro area study uses the arti…cial Euro data from Fagan et al. (2001) , over the sample 1970(1)-1998(2). The equations are estimated using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) framework. The steady-state values in the equations are taken from the sample means 15 . As noted above, the highly nonlinear nature of the estimation equations and the need for su¢ cient restrictions to ensure identi…cation imply that some of the model parameters have to be imposed. In particular, in the case of the USA in estimating the Phillips Curve we have to impose that the price elasticity of the di¤erentiated goods, is equal to 4, implying a price-mark-up 16 of 30%, that the labour elasticity of output, 1 is equal to 0:6 and that in Version I of the model, the habit formation parameter on aggregate consumption ( ) is unity 17 , which implies that the stock of habits are equal to aggregate lagged consumer expenditure. In the case of the Euro area the estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the consumption function ( ) were imprecise and we imposed a value of 4, following a grid search 18 . Similarly, in the case of the USA, we could not get precise estimates without imposing a value for the discount factor in the consumers'optimization problem ( ), which following a grid search so as to minimize the criterion function was …xed at 0.99. Thus, in the case of Version I of the model, our structural model is essentially estimated, subject to the restrictions on the steady-state values and on the above parameters. Table 1 reports the estimated values of the key structural parameters in our models (see Muscatelli et al., 2003b Muscatelli et al., , 2004b .
In the case of version II, we use a calibrated model, retaining the parameter values estimated in Version I of the model, augmenting them with a calibrated value for the probability of death 19 ($). Here we assume that (1 $) = 0:9943 which implies an average life-span for the consumer of 30 years, as our models are based on quarterly data.
in the value of : However, a higher mark-up does seem to be more sensible given that marginal costs exclude capital costs in this framework. In addition, a higher value of would imply an implausibly small direct e¤ect of output on prices through the marginal cost term. For the Euro area estimates, Galí et al. (2001) use a labour income share of 0.75. 17 In our earlier study, Muscatelli et al. (2003a) , where we estimate freely in a simpler version of the IS curve we found that it was insigni…cantly di¤erent from unity. 18 In current work we are exploring alternative estimation methodologies (see Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2004) . 19 In practice we would not expect the addition of an additional term to the IS equation with an imposed parameter to make a considerable di¤erence to the estimated structural parameters. that is given by 4 = ( 1 =(1 3 )), and is signi…cantly greater than unity ( 4 = 1:817 with an asymptotic standard error equal to 0.095 ). For the case of the Euro-area, we use the estimated interest rate rule parameters reported in Sauer and Sturm (2003) .
Simulation Results
We now use these estimated and calibrated models to illustrate the extent to which …scal policy might provide a useful role in stabilization policy. We begin by looking at some of the properties of the di¤erent versions of the New Keynesian model in relation to the transmission of …scal policy, and then examine the extent to which the richer version of the model provides us with useful insights for current policy questions.
In the case of Euroland, clearly the assumption of a single …scal authority is false, and the characterization would be one where similar symmetric shocks are hitting all countries in the Euro area, and the …scal rules assumed here represent an aggregate response. In Section 5 we will consider the more realistic case of a two-country model where each country has its own …scal authority so that we can consider asymmetric shocks. Figures 1-4 show, for the case of the Version I model, estimated on US data, the response pro…les of output and in ‡ation following a temporary shock to the IS curve (Figures 1-2 ) and to the Phillips curve (Figures 3-4 ) 21 . For each shock we examine the behavior of the model when the monetary policy rule alone (1) is active, and when both monetary policy and the …scal policy rules (2) and (3) are active. When monetary policy is acting alone, we set Figures 1-4 show that in Version I …scal policy does reduce the volatility of output and in ‡ation in response to demand shocks, and the volatility of output due to a supply shock. Government spending stabilizes output directly, via the resource-withdrawal e¤ect in the IS curve which impacts on optimizing consumers. Taxation functions through two channels. Personal taxes reduce the disposable income of ROT consumers, and thereby impact on optimizing consumers. Payroll taxes reduce aggregate supply by increasing the cost of production of …rms. However, payroll taxes also tend to increase prices (cf. Buti et al., 2003) .
The transmission of …scal policy under di¤erent models
What role do ROT consumers play in the transmission of …scal policy? In order to see this, we plot Figures 5-8 , which repeat the shocks in Figures 4, but where we have modi…ed the baseline parameters of the Version I model to include a higher proportion of ROT consumers. To be precise, these …gures show the impact of raising the proportion of employment made up by ROT consumers 22 (N RT =N ) to 0.7, and consequently lowering the proportion of consumption determined by optimizing consumers (C o =C) to 0.571. Having more ROT consumers makes the economy more volatile to demand and supply shocks. It is important to note that there are two effects at play here. First, increasing the number of ROT consumers makes payroll taxes more e¤ective. Second, it reduces the degree of consumption smoothing, and reduces the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy by reducing the size of the coe¢ cient on the interest rate in the IS curve. This second e¤ect is found to dominate 23 . Fiscal policy does add assist monetary policy, whose potency has diminished, as payroll taxes impact directly on ROT consumers' disposable income and expenditure.
However, as might be expected in version I of the model, where …scal policy plays a limited role, the impact on volatility is not large. This supports the …ndings of Andrés and Doménech (2003) . Our models do not allow for major tax distortions and hence they have more limited supply e¤ects. It is apparent why, quantitatively, if taxation were to have distortionary e¤ects on supply, it might outweigh the bene…ts of aggregate demand stabilization.
Next, let us consider what the impact is of allowing Blanchard-type …nite horizons in consumer behavior, as in version II of the model. Table 2 shows, for the case of the USA, the variance of output and in ‡ation when we simulate Version II of the model following a demand and supply shock, in the case where the optimizing consumers have …nite horizons, and the special case 24 where the consumers have in…nite horizons as the probability of death goes to zero. The demand (IS) and supply (NKPC) shocks are identical to the experiments performed with Version I. Note that the impact of introducing …nite horizons is that …scal policy becomes more powerful, as the variance of output is reduced considerably by adding …scal policy (M+…scal) to monetary policy alone (M). In all cases, the impact on the variability of in ‡ation is small. The reduction in output volatility works through two channels: in terms of the …rst-period response of output to shocks it is less than with in…nite horizons, as the feedback response of …scal policy to output and the impact of …scal and monetary policy on debt dynamics is factored into consumers'expectations. However, the cyclical impact of the monetary-…scal interactions is more marked, and provokes a cyclical rather than a monotonic adjustment, potentially increasing the variability of output and in ‡ation. The cyclicality is due to the dynamic interaction between Blanchard-type consumers'response to the debt dynamics in the model, and the ROT consumers who introduce inertia in consumer spending. Therefore potentially there is a trade-o¤ from …nite horizons, and this result may be dependent on the model's parameters. It would therefore be interesting to do some sensitivity analysis, by comparing the performance of …scal policy in the USA with that in our model estimated and calibrated on Eurozone data, and to check to what extent the results are dependent on the strength of …scal policy's cyclical response and monetary policy's response to in ‡ation. We now examine this issue.
Does Fiscal Policy Help to Stabilize Output and
In ‡ation? The USA versus Europe
In order to address this question, we extend the results of Table 2 by comparing the cases of the USA and Europe. To limit the number of cases considered, we focus solely on supply shocks. We also consider the impact of varying the responses of …scal and monetary policy. Again, Table 3 shows the variances of output and in ‡ation when the model is simulated with only monetary policy active (M), and monetary plus …scal policy (M+…scal). In addition, however, we also show what happens if …scal policy responds more powerfully over the cycle ( 2 = ' 2 = 0:9), designated by M+…scal2, than in the baseline case; and we show what happens if monetary policy responds more powerfully to in ‡ation ( 4 = 2:4), designated as M2+…scal, than in the baseline case. Table 3 that, in the case of Europe (a) …scal policy reduces output variability more than in the USA; and (b) the existence of Blanchardtype …nite horizons enhances …scal policy more than in the USA. In comparison, however, Europe exhibits a larger trade-o¤ in terms of higher in ‡ation variability. Note, however, that the impact on in ‡ation volatility is much smaller than that of output volatility, so that …scal policy is likely to be welfare-enhancing unless a much greater weight is placed on in ‡ation stability 25 .
The explanation for the greater impact of …scal policy in Europe probably lies in three factors: the higher steady-state share of taxation, which strengthens the force of …scal policy; the slightly higher average steady-state level of debt which increases the impact of wealth e¤ects on consumption; and the higher share of ROT consumers as evidenced by the estimated structural parameters reported in Table 1 .
It does suggest a greater advantage to using …scal policy in Europe. However, we should recall that we are considering the arti…cial case of a coordinated …scal policy across the Eurozone. A more pertinent question is whether in the actual case of a centralized European Central Bank monetary policy and a decentralized (and uncoordinated) …scal policy across di¤erent Eurozone countries this apparent advantage to using …scal policy countercyclically still holds. We now address this point using a two-country version of our model.
Fiscal Policy and EMU: a Two-Country Version of the Euro Model
Given the positive results obtained for the use of …scal policy in the Version II model calibrated on Eurozone data, the natural question is whether one could …nd a role for …scal policy in a two-country version of the model where shocks and …scal responses are not perfectly symmetric, and where …scal policy is delegated to national authorities but there is a single ECB. Analyzing monetary-…scal policy interactions in two-country model would require a full paper in itself, and here we can only begin to highlight some of the issues that one might address. In a follow-up paper (Muscatelli et al., 2005) we explore the issue more fully, using a richer open economy model 26 . In order to make our results comparable with those in the previous sections, we take the simplest possible case: we assume that the two countries are entirely symmetric in terms of structure, so that each has the same structural parameters as those estimated on Euro-wide data. The detailed model is outlined in the Appendix.
The model can be parameterized using the same structural parameter and steady state values as the single Euro-area model. The only caveat is that the assumed price elasticity of demand is quite large, as it is set at 4, and this implies a rather large relative demand e¤ect within EMU. However, for most of the shocks considered here the movement in relative prices between countries is quite small, so the relative demand e¤ect will not dominate the results.
The other point to note is that equilibrium in asset markets implies that the sum of domestic and foreign bonds held by consumers in both country equals the joint supply of bonds provided by each …scal authority. In simulating the model one could focus on equilibria where, given the absence of default risk and exchange risk, the debt of each …scal authority grows or declines over time. However, recall that the …scal rules for each country not only a includes a feedback term on the output gap and an autoregressive parameter, but also has a feedback on deviations of debt from steady state (with feedback parameters 3 = ' 3 = 0:05). This means that following the shock the model returns to a more realistic steady state, which embodies the type of constraint envisaged in the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. Each country will seek to restore its initial level of debt. Given that our model is in deviations from equilibrium, this is equivalent to the …scal authorities targeting a given level of the debt-income ratio.
Fiscal and Monetary Interactions in a Two-Country Model
In considering asymmetric shocks, we focus on demand and supply shocks on one of the two EMU countries. The reason for not considering pure asymmetric shocks (shocks of equal and opposite sign on each EMU country) is that, given the identical structure of the two countries, and that the ECB is assumed to target EMU average outcomes, monetary policy will not react to such shocks, and there will not be any …scal-monetary policy interactions. Instead we focus on temporary shocks to the IS curve and Phillips curve of one of the two EMU countries, using the same format for the demand and supply shocks as we have used before.
Again we tabulate our results for the variance of output and in ‡ation in each country when the …scal rules are active and are absent in Table 4 . Table 4 shows the case where only ECB policy is active (M) and the case where ECB policy and both countries …scal policies are active (M+…scal). In order to clarify the discussion, we normalize the variances of output and in ‡ation relative to the case where monetary policy is operating alone (i.e. we normalize the …rst row of variances of each shock to unity). This shows the net impact of adding …scal policy to a central monetary policy. In our discussion we shall focus mainly on output, as the impact of …scal policies through demand on in ‡ation are quite small given the coe¢ cients on outputs and payroll taxes in the estimated Phillips curve, and any bene…ts from …scal policy will accrue largely through output stabilization. This was also apparent from the earlier single-country simulations following a supply shock. Turning …rst to the demand shock, we see that there is a reduction in output volatility, albeit a small one, in country 1. In the case of country 2 the initial impact of the …scal policy is to cause a greater deviation in output from equilibrium, although the speed of convergence is slightly improved. The overall impact is to increase the variance of output slightly as can be seen from Table 4 , with most of the variation coming in the …rst 2-3 quarters. The reasons why in a two-country setting the value added from …scal policy is less than might be expected is that we are not considering a pure asymmetric shock, when the two countries'…scal policies would be acting in concert and monetary policy remains inactive 27 . In the single country shock considered here, the monetary authority reacts to the demand shock by raising interest rates, thus causing output to fall in country 2. Thus, the two …scal policies will be acting against each other in the short run. In addition, the presence of a feedback term on debt implies that the increase in interest rates will increase debt …nance and will partially constrain …scal policy in both countries. As noted by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004) , varying the feedback term on debt in the …scal rule can have a signi…cant impact on the output dynamics in a model with Blanchard-type consumers.
Turning to the supply shock, again we observe a reduction in variability in output in country 1, but in country 2 output variability increases, as the cost of adjustment is pushed from country 1 to country 2. Given that the …scal rules in the two countries are symmetric and operate with some inertia, country 2 su¤ers again from the fact that the ECB reacts to future expected in ‡ation increases, and forward-looking consumers take this into account. This externality from …scal policy is partly a result of the formulation of the …scal rules, and in Muscatelli et al. (2005) we investigate the robustness of this con ‡ict in greater detail. In general we …nd that some aspects of the …scal con ‡ict are robust to di¤erent speci…cations, including a more contemporaneous correlation between automatic stabilizers and output.
Conclusions
In this review we have provided a preliminary assessment of the extent to which …scal policy provides a valuable tool for stabilization alongside monetary policy in the context of New Keynesian models.
What have we learned? There are three main themes that emerge. The …rst is that, once one allows for substantial deviations from the assumption that consumers are fully optimizing and have in…nite horizons, there is considerable scope for …scal policy to reduce output volatility, although in some contexts this might be at no improvement in terms of reducing in ‡ation volatility, or may result in trading o¤ lower output volatility against higher in ‡ation volatility.
The second theme is that estimated New Keynesian models still involve limited channels for …scal-monetary policy interactions. Our model allow for a richer range than some recent New Keynesian models, but in other respects are still limited: for instance in the range of taxation distortions on the supply side, which may be signi…cant in reducing the e¢ ciency of …scal policy. Allowing an impact of public expenditure on private consumption and investment may change the results in either direction. The e¢ ciency of …scal policy will also be reduced by the extent to which the …scal policy instruments are subject to stochastic deviations which are proportional to the strength of the …scal stabilizers. Finally, as with most estimated New Keynesian models, our models are limited in the range of parameters that can be freely estimated. The development of new estimation techniques in this area may improve the robustness of our estimates.
The third main theme is that in two-country models it becomes apparent that automatic stabilizers may, in certain circumstances, o¤set each other in ways that may limit the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. In general the focus has been on the ability of …scal stabilizers to cope with the case of a pure asymmetric shock, where externalities still exist, but where providing …scal policy reactions are su¢ ciently aggressive, output can be stabilized. What we focus on here is the interactions between …scal and monetary policy where there is an asymmetric shock which impacts di¤erentially on the two countries and therefore triggers as response from the ECB. We demonstrate that this might hamper the e¢ cacy of …scal policy. In these cases, the precise design of the feedback rules and the automatic stabilizers becomes important and this should be the subject of further research (see Muscatelli et al., 2005) . In particular, looking at optimally designed simple rules should improve the performance of …scal policy against the benchmarks analyzed here.
To sum up, New Keynesian models have evolved to the point where a role can be found for …scal policy, and empirically estimated models suggest that such policies could be welfare enhancing. But there is no unambiguous endorsement of some of the more optimistic Keynesian pronouncements of the 1960s and early 1970s, which saw …scal policy as a necessary tool of stabilization policy even for relatively small deviations from the full employment/natural rate equilibrium. In this sense there is no return to the Keynesian economics of the early post-war era. Consumers As noted above, in this version of the model we follow Galí et al. (2002) by assuming two types of consumers, although we also assume that the optimizing consumers'utility is a¤ected by habit. A proportion # of consumers follow a rule of thumb, and consume out of current disposable income. This admittedly ad hoc assumption may be justi…ed by assuming myopia or limited participation to capital markets. We also assume that ruleof-thumb consumers supply a …xed amount of labour. Thus the consumption function of the representative rule-of-thumb consumer, j, depends on current disposable income:
where P t is the consumption price level, N RT de…nes a constant amount of labour supply 28 , W t is the nominal wage, G ; minus taxes, T j t ) lump-sum by assumption. Consumers in the second group, i, bene…t from full access to capital markets and are therefore free to optimize. The proportion of optimizing consumers in the economy is given as (1 #): Each optimizing consumer is assumed to maximize an intertemporal utility function given by:
where C o t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be de…ned below), H t is an index of external habits, is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, N o t is the level of employment, and " l is a shock to labour supply. As in Smets and Wouters (2002) , money does not appear in the 28 Galì et al. (2003) show that supplying a constant amount of labour is optimal when consumption and leisure are non-separable in the utility function and net taxes, levied on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result would never obtain in our model, where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. For sake of simplicity we assume a constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be negative, this implies that we impose a lower bound on G T R t T t for any given level of the real wage. utility function(6), nor is part of …nancial wealth 29 .We assume that habits depend on past aggregate consumption, C T :
Optimizing consumers maximize (6) subject to their intertemporal budget constraint, which is expressed as:
where consumers hold their …nancial wealth in the form of in ‡ation-indexed bonds, B, which yield a real return of r t . The optimizing consumer's disposable income consists of real labour income Firms Firms' production technology is assumed to be a simple CobbDouglas function of labour and capital for each consumption good variety z. Capital is assumed …xed and normalized to unity:
We introduce …scal distortions by assuming that taxes on labour take the form of a uniform payroll tax 30 . Therefore …rms'demand for labour is de…ned as:
where t is the tax rate per unit of employed labour, i.e. t = T N , where T are the total revenues from the payroll tax.
Turning next to the model of …rms'pricing behavior, we consider a standard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in Galí et al. (2001) , and Leith and Malley (2002) 31 . Total consumption is given by a 29 As in Woodford (2003) , the economy is assumed to be 'cashless' in the limit at the steady-state equilibrium. 30 This implies that the optimizing consumer's choice between leisure and consumption is not a¤ected.
31 See also Erceg et al. (2000) , and Sbordone (2002) .
standard CES function of imperfectly substitutable varieties of consumption goods z:
Given this, consumption of each variety of the consumption good is given by:
where P t (z) is the price of good z, and P t is the consumption price index given by the aggregator:
Sticky prices in the model are modeled as described in the main text.
Version II
Consumers In this second version of the model all individuals do not expect to live forever and face a constant probability of death in each period, $. However, as before there are two types of consumers. A proportion # of consumers follow a rule of thumb, as in (5).
The optimizing consumers, making up a proportion (1 #), now behave di¤erently because of the presence of a …nite horizon. Each optimizing consumer i in cohort s, is assumed to maximize an intertemporal utility function given by: 
where the notation is the same as above. 
where again the notation is as before. Again, we assume that government debt is indexed. For an comparison of cases where government debt are indexed and non-indexed in a model with Blanchard-type consumers, see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004) .
In this version of the model we assume the same behavior on the part of …rms as in Version I.
Estimation Models
By log-linearizing the model around steady state we are then able to derive the New Keynesian 'IS-curve'and 'Phillips curve'(for proofs, see Muscatelli et al., 2003a ,b, Leith and Malley, 2002 , Galí et al., 2001 .
The IS curves under Versions I and II are given by: Version I: 
where: a 1 = ;
The Phillips Curve is given by: 
The IS curve and Phillips curve constitute our structural model, which is then simulated jointly with the policy rules, the government budget constraint, and with the assumptions made about nominal wage adjustment.
A Two-country New Keynesian Model
We now extend the model to account for open economy features, assuming that two countries (Domestic, d, and Foreign, f ) form a monetary union. Total consumption is still de…ned as in (11), but only a proportion n of them is produced in the Home economy. Domestic consumers can now hold their wealth in domestic (B d ) or foreign (B f ) bonds, denominated in the same currency, and earning the same nominal return, i t . The Home price index is therefore de…ned as: (19) 32 Galí et al. (2001) specify (18) in terms of average real marginal cost (mc). Note that, in levels:
(1 ) mc t where P f t (z) de…nes the foreign currency price of good (z) and e is the …xed nominal exchange rate, normalized at 1 33 . Home consumer's demand for product z is de…ned as: 
As in Leith and Wren Lewis (2004) we assume that PPP holds for the aggregate price level, and therefore world demand for product z is given by:
The log-linearised two-country model is then given by: 
